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Abstract This paper examines the relationship between working in the formal or
informal sector and self-reported individual ﬁnancial satisfaction in a country in transition.
It does so by allowing for individual heterogeneity in terms of perceived ﬁnancial inse-
curity and tax morale. The empirical analysis uses a dataset for Albania, a country in
transition. The method applied is the ‘self-administered questionnaire’, which combines
personal contacts with written questionnaire. The results indicate that, for most individuals,
working in the informal sector has negative effects on their self reported ﬁnancial satis-
faction. For some individuals, however, this effect is positive. The characteristic deﬁning
these two groups of individuals is their attitude towards the perceived ﬁnancial insecurity
related to not paying taxes. These ﬁndings have important implications, in particular for
transition countries with large informal sectors. Given the involuntary participation in the
informal sector in these countries, the majority of individuals working in this sector will
remain ﬁnancially dissatisﬁed as long as they have no other social safety net.
Keywords Financial satisfaction   Informal sector   Tax morale   Transition
1 Introduction
An important episode in the previous century was the rise and fall of communist economies
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. The collapse of these economies led to
the emergence of so-called transition countries, which are characterized by rapid economic
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DOI 10.1007/s11205-010-9684-6and institutional change. This transformation has been accompanied by the appearance of a
substantial informal sector. From an economic sociology perspective, the informal sector is
important for social (in)equality through both the re-allocation of resources it causes and its
impact on individuals’ welfare. This paper focuses on the latter.
Early studies argue that average individual earnings in the informal sector are lower
than in the formal sector (Harris and Todaro 1970; Merrick 1976; Kugler et al. 1979;
Bourguignon 1979; Banerjee 1982; Heckman and Hotz 1986; Pradhan and van Soest 1995;
Pisani and Paga ´n 2003). Thomas (1990) presents evidence that this mainly holds for less
developed countries. Other studies suggest that the earnings distributions in the formal and
informal sectors have substantial overlap (Fields 1990), so that the differences may be
smaller than is commonly thought (Charmes 1990). These ﬁndings have identiﬁed two sub-
sectors within the informal sector. One is called the ‘upper-tier informal sector’. This is
characterized by limited-entry and high wages (relative to the formal sector), and is pre-
ferred by workers to formal sector employment. The other is called the ‘easy-entry
informal sector’, which consists of employment that is characterized by free-entry and low
wages. Workers consider the latter to be undesirable relative to formal sector employment.
Based on this distinction, Fields (1990) reports that individuals working in the upper-tier
informal sector have voluntarily moved there from the formal sector and are happy about
their choice. For these individuals, the disadvantages of working in the informal sector are
outweighed by the advantages. Individuals who participate in the easy-entry informal
sector are dissatisﬁed with working in the informal sector and are typically looking for jobs
in the formal sector.
In other words, other factors than (net) income may affect the well-being associated
with the informal sector compared to the formal sector. For example, aside from the
ﬁnancial advantage of not paying taxes (e.g., Hansson 1982), the informal sector some-
times provides more ﬂexibility and opportunities for individual initiative and creativity
than the formal sector (De Grazia 1982; Renooy 1990; Marcouiller et al. 1997). However,
in addition to lower earnings, working in the informal sector may have other disadvan-
tages: workers often experience worse working conditions, face higher job insecurity, have
no labor contract and, as a consequence are excluded from various social beneﬁts.
1 For
these reasons, a comparison based on subjective measures of well-being may be preferable
to direct comparisons of net income. In this paper, we present such a comparison in an
attempt to better understand the motivations behind working in the informal sector and the
consequences thereof for individual welfare.
Though the existing literature touches upon welfare differences between the two sectors,
a systematic analysis is missing. Income is often used to compare individuals across
sectors, but as mentioned above, there is more to welfare than just income (e.g.,
(un)certainty about the future and (lack of) social security). In this paper, we use instead a
broader concept of economic welfare, which is captured by individuals’ own evaluation of
their ﬁnancial situation, i.e., their ﬁnancial satisfaction. Reported ﬁnancial satisfaction is a
measure of the contentment that individuals derive from their economic situation and it is
therefore correlated but not identical to individuals’ income and wealth. Financial satis-
faction relates to how individuals perceive their economic situation, which typically
depends on the individual socio-economic situation and on how their ﬁnancial situation
compares to the past, to other individuals in the society, and to what individuals expect in
the future. This paper ﬁlls the existing gap by offering a ﬁrst (econometric) analysis of the
1 Nevertheless, working in the informal sector is often preferred to being unemployed (De Grazia 1982;
Kesner-Skreb 1997;G e ¨rxhani 2004b).
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123effect of working in the (in)formal sector on individual self-reported ﬁnancial situation. It
is through such an analysis that we are able to systematically understand individual
motivations of working in the informal sector and their implications for individuals’
ﬁnancial satisfaction.
The empirical analysis uses a dataset for Albania, a country in transition. After the
collapse of communism, a combination of economic, social and institutional factors cre-
ated suitable conditions for the informal sector to be prevalent in Albania (Ge ¨rxhani and
Schram 2006).
2 Moreover, individual involvement in the informal sector in this country is
not voluntary. This is due to a limited number of jobs available in the formal sector
combined with trivial and short-termed ﬁnancial support by the Albanian welfare system.
As shown by Ge ¨rxhani (2004b), this lack of choice is a fundamental difference between
the informal sector in developed countries and that in transition countries like Albania. In
the latter countries, ‘survival’ plays an important role in the decision to participate in the
informal sector.
3 In another study, on the dichotomous sectoral composition of labor in
Nicaragua, Pisani and Paga ´n( 2003) argue that ‘‘unlike developed countries which have a
functional social safety net for unemployed people to ‘wait’ or queue for formal sector
employment, Nicaragua has virtually no social safety net; this compels potential formal
sector job seekers to work in the informal sector (which acts as the de facto social safety
net) while awaiting formal sector employment.’’ (p. 574). Clearly, transition (undeveloped)
countries provide special cases. This is not only related to their large shadow economies,
but also to the fact that most individuals in these countries are often constrained to work in
the informal sector which is characterized by labor intensive and low technology. As a
consequence, the allocation of resources and success within the society will be distorted,
resulting in support rather than moderation of social inequality (Bromley and Gerry 1979;
Ditton and Brown 1981; Moser 1994; Leonard 2002). Hence, individual motivations for
working in the (in)formal sector are expected to have important implications for individual
welfare and social (in)equality in such countries.
Finally, this paper takes the analysis one step further by recognizing that individuals are
not homogenous economic agents with identical perceptions of their own welfare. In the
empirical application, it identiﬁes two groups of individuals, distinguished by their atti-
tudes towards taxes. An important distinction between working in the formal and informal
sector is whether or not individuals pay taxes. Individuals may, however, differ in (1) how
they perceive the ﬁnancial consequences of (not) paying taxes and in (2) their beliefs about
contributing to public goods by paying taxes. By allowing for these differences in indi-
vidual motivations to work in the (in)formal sector, the analysis provides a more accurate
explanation for heterogeneity in ﬁnancial satisfaction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical
approach. This involves a description of the question used to capture ﬁnancial satisfaction,
an explanation of the econometric approach, and a characterization of the data. Section 3
presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The average size of the shadow economy in Albania was estimated to be 33.4% in 1999/2000 (Schneider
2005). This same study shows that the size of the shadow economy is on average higher in transition
countries than in developed countries.
3 The fact that formal and informal sectors are often found to be complementary in transition countries is
another indication of the survival aspect of the informal sector in these countries. A broader discussion can
be found in Schneider and Enste (2000).
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1232 The Empirical Approach
2.1 Subjective Measures
Psychologists have measured individual well-being by means of subjective questions
since the late 1960s, starting with Cantril (1965), Wilson (1967) and Bradburn (1969).
An overview of this literature is presented in Kahneman et al. (1999). More recently,
many economists have made use of subjective questions on, among others, welfare
(ﬁnancial satisfaction), well-being, and health satisfaction, to address a wide range of
scientiﬁcally and politically relevant questions.
4 Subjective questions ask individuals
about their life satisfaction in general or with respect to various domains of life in
particular, such as housing, health, or their ﬁnancial situation. The most relevant char-
acteristic of the subjective measures is their focus on individual perceptions rather than
on their objective situation. This implies that individuals’ subjective evaluation of their
own circumstances can change even when the objective situation remains the same. This
can happen, for example, if individuals adapt to past income changes or to health
impediments.
The focus of this paper is the consequences for ﬁnancial satisfaction of working in the
formal or informal sector, hence the following question is used:
‘‘How satisﬁed are you with the ﬁnancial situation of your household?’’
Individuals are asked to evaluate their satisfaction on a 0–10 scale, where 0 stands for
‘totally dissatisﬁed’ and 10 for ‘totally satisﬁed’. This information will be referred to as
individual ﬁnancial satisfaction. Financial satisfaction reﬂects individuals’ perceptions of
their economic situation. This means that two individuals who have the same income
can experience different ﬁnancial satisfaction levels. The analysis presented here sheds
light on the question of whether—over and above its implications for income—the
sector in which one works affects ﬁnancial satisfaction. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2004) make use of the same question when studying the extent of poverty in
Russia.
5
The empirical analysis of ﬁnancial satisfaction—as for any subjective measure-
requires two main assumptions, which we consider warranted. First, individuals are able
and willing to evaluate their own ﬁnancial satisfaction in a questionnaire. Second, the
answers to the ﬁnancial satisfaction question are interpersonally comparable. In other
words, it is assumed that different individuals understand and respond to the ﬁnancial
question in similar ways. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these two
assumptions. A detailed discussion is provided in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)
and Senik (2005).
4 Studies include Clark and Oswald (1994); Kapteyn (1994); Ng (1997); Oswald (1997); van Praag and
Frijters (1999); Pradhan and Ravallion (2000); DiTella et al. (2001); Easterlin (2001); Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and van Praag (2002); Frey and Stutzer (2002); Ravallion and Lokshin (2002); Torgler (2003); van Praag
et al. (2003); Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004); Frijters et al. (2004); Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005); and
Torgler and Schneider (2005).
5 Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) use another subjective welfare question, called the Economic Welfare
Question, to explain the large differences between objective and subjective poverty in Russia. Other sub-
jective measures of poverty are based on the Income Evaluation Question, the Minimum Income Question,
and the Minimum Spending Question (see, e.g., van Praag 1971; Kapteyn et al. 1988; van Praag et al. 1997;
Garner and Short 2003; and Gustafsson et al. 2004).
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1232.2 The Empirical Model
At the theoretical level, it is important to distinguish between giving cardinal or ordinal
meaning to the satisfaction question. When individual answers to the ﬁnancial satisfaction
question are considered cardinal, it is assumed that the distance between satisfaction
categories is identical, i.e., the distance between a 4 and 5 is the same as between a 5 and a 6.
This implies that an individual reporting an ‘8’ is twice as satisﬁed as one who reported a ‘4’.
If the individual responses to ﬁnancial satisfaction are considered ordinal, only the ordering
of the individuals in a satisfaction scale is known but not the magnitude of the differences.
At the empirical level, however, this distinction does not appear to be relevant. Linear and
ordered categorical models are used indiscriminately, as they provide very similar results
in terms of the trade-offs between variables (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004; van
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004, Chap. 2).
In this paper, we consider the answers to the ﬁnancial satisfaction question as cardinal
and consequently use an OLS estimator. This allows us to clearly interpret the interaction
terms that are included in the main regression (cf. Table 1).
6
Individual ﬁnancial satisfaction is described by the following empirical model:
FS ¼ a þ bLnðyÞþcI þ dX þ e ð1Þ
where FS is the reported ﬁnancial satisfaction on a 0–10 scale. Equation 1 shows that the
ﬁnancial satisfaction is explained by whether an individual works in the informal sector (I),
by the household (monthly) net income (y), and by a set of socio-economic and demo-
graphic variables (X). I is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the individual works in
the informal sector, and 0 if (s)he works in the formal sector. The household income is
taken in logarithmic form. This speciﬁcation is chosen to reﬂect a diminishing marginal
utility of income. The error term e represents the part of FS that cannot be explained.
2.3 Heterogeneous Individuals
One main characteristic of individuals working in the informal sector is that they do not
pay taxes, which as such excludes them from public insurance schemes.
7 Given that
ﬁnancial satisfaction partly depends on individuals’ expectations about their future situa-
tion, the degree of perceived ﬁnancial insecurity related to working in the informal sector
may have an impact on individual ﬁnancial satisfaction. Assuming that for most individ-
uals public insurance schemes are the only source of social safety net, one would expect a
lower ﬁnancial satisfaction for individuals working in the informal sector than for those
working in the formal sector.
The degree of perceived ﬁnancial insecurity is captured in our data set by the answer to
the question on whether individuals (dis)agree (on a 5-point scale) with the following
statement: ‘‘Not paying social and health insurance today would cause serious ﬁnancial
problems for me in the future (e.g., no pension beneﬁts)’’. Individuals working in the
informal sector who disagree with this statement may either not understand that not paying
social security taxes today means not receiving beneﬁts in the future or may have other
6 We obtained similar results when we regressing Financial Satisfaction with an Ordered Probit (OP)
estimator.
7 In Albania, our case study, payment of social and health insurance premiums is mandatory and is directly
subtracted from income together with other taxes. In addition, an individual is entitled to beneﬁts only if
(s)he has contributed to the scheme (see Beqja 2002).
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123means to provide for themselves in the future (e.g., through family members or accumu-
lated wealth). In the latter case, individuals in the informal sector may think that a pooled
insurance is less beneﬁcial to them than their own private way of insuring the future. In
other words, they perceive a low degree of ﬁnancial insecurity when working in the
informal sector and thus not paying taxes may even positively affect their current ﬁnancial
satisfaction. In contrast, individuals working in the informal sector who agree that there
will be negative ﬁnancial consequences in the future of not paying taxes today, may have
no other means of insuring their future. As such, they perceive a high degree of ﬁnancial
insecurity and will probably report a lower ﬁnancial satisfaction than if they were to work
in the formal sector.
Another important aspect related to informal sector working and the associated non-
payment of taxes is tax morale (see Alm and Torgler 2005, 2006; Alm et al. 2006; Feld and
Torgler 2006; Torgler and Schneider 2007; and Torgler 2007). Tax morale is often deﬁned
as ‘‘individuals’ willingness to pay taxes or, in other words, the moral obligation to pay
taxes or the belief in contributing to the society by paying taxes’’ (Cummings et al. 2009).
Many studies argue that tax morale does not only depend on one’s upbringing but also on
the speciﬁc institutional context, including for example, experience with tax authorities,
interaction with other taxpayers, the constitutional environment, enforcement mechanisms,
and insecurity of property rights (Frey 1989; Alm et al. 1992; Feld and Frey 2002;
Schneider and Enste 2003; Torgler 2003; Frey and Torgler 2007; Bird et al. 2008; Torgler
and Schneider 2009). In other words, tax morale reﬂects individuals’ willingness to con-
tribute to society through taxes, which goes hand in hand with the belief that taxes are
useful. This implies that tax morale is highly correlated with individuals’ willingness to
contribute to public goods.
8
Based on the information included in the data set at hand, we proxy tax morale by
whether individuals (dis)agree (on a 5-point scale) with: ‘‘People should pay taxes because
if they do, they will beneﬁt from them (e.g., better roads, more parks, and more schools)’’.
Individuals, who agree that people should pay taxes because of the public beneﬁts
involved, reveal a high level of tax morale. We postulate that for these individuals, paying
taxes (i.e., contributing to public goods) can positively affect their ﬁnancial satisfaction in
two ways: (1) they themselves enjoy a larger provision of public goods; (2) altruistic
individuals who contribute to public goods will experience a utility gain due to contrib-
uting to the welfare of others, i.e., the economic burden of having to pay taxes may be
compensated by the pleasure of contributing to the group’s welfare. The last is known as
the ‘warm-glow’ effect, described by Andreoni (1990: 473) as the utility gain ‘‘from the act
of giving’’. For individuals working in the informal sector, this means that those with high
tax morale may enjoy a low level of ﬁnancial satisfaction, as they are unable to contribute
to public goods. For individuals with low tax morale, however, working in the informal
sector and thus not paying taxes should not have any impact on their ﬁnancial satisfaction.
To sum up, we hypothesize that the effect of working in the (in)formal sector on
reported ﬁnancial satisfaction will depend on individuals’ perceived ﬁnancial insecurity
and their tax morale. In order to test this hypothesis, the empirical analysis distinguishes
between various types of individuals (deﬁned by their perceived ﬁnancial insecurity and
their tax morale), for whom the impact of working in the (in)formal sector on ﬁnancial
satisfaction may differ.
8 Experimental evidence shows that one reason why people contribute to taxes is because they ﬁnance
public goods (e.g., Becker et al. 1987; Alm et al. 1992).
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123This hypothesis is operationalized by including two new variables in Eq. 1: one indi-
cating the degree of agreement with the statement that not paying taxes today gives
ﬁnancial insecurity in the future; and the other indicating the degree of tax morale (i.e., the
degree of agreement with the statement that people should pay taxes because of the public
beneﬁts involved). These two variables (called FI and HTm, respectively) can take 5
values, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (=1) to ‘strongly agree’ (=5).
9 In the empirical
analysis we attach cardinal value to both variables, the perceived ﬁnancial insecurity
related to not paying taxes and the tax morale.
10 Financial satisfaction is regressed
including two interaction terms between working in the informal sector and the two
variables, FI and HTm. Additionally, the perceived ﬁnancial insecurity and the tax morale
are included separately in the analysis so as to differentiate between their indirect effects
through working in the informal sector and their direct effects on ﬁnancial satisfaction.
Financial satisfaction is now explained by:
FS ¼ a þ bLnðyÞþcI þ uðI   FIÞþ/FI þ pðI   HTmÞþjHTm þ dX þ e ð2Þ
The effect that working in the informal sector has on the ﬁnancial satisfaction is
described by c;( c ? u), or (c ?u ? p) depending on individuals’ perceived ﬁnancial
insecurity related to not paying taxes and their tax morale. If these three coefﬁcients are
identical, all the individuals are affected in the same way. For completeness, the empirical
analysis includes a third speciﬁcation in which we exclude the interaction terms from
Eq. 2. This speciﬁcation allows us to identify whether the differences (if any) in c between
Eqs. 1, 2 are related to the perceived ﬁnancial insecurity and tax morale variables or to the
interaction terms between these variables and working in the informal sector.
2.4 Endogeneity of the Sector Choice
An empirical concern is that the sector choice may be endogenous. Here we consider three
potential ways (two from the supply side and one from the demand side) in which the
assumed exogeneity of sector choice may affect the extent to which the results can be
interpreted.
From the supply side, endogeneity occurs if individuals self-select themselves into
either the formal or informal sector. Most of the previous recent research models tax
evasion and occupational decisions as an individual choice (see, for example, Watson
1985; Jung et al. 1994; Schroyen 1997). While this research refers to developed countries,
the literature about less developed countries argues that working in the informal sector is
not a matter of choice in a transition country like Albania (cf. Sect. 1). In this paper we
empirically test this hypothesis. If there were a free choice of sector, individuals would
choose the sector where they obtain a higher ﬁnancial satisfaction.
11 In this case, one
would expect individuals who do not perceive important ﬁnancial consequences in the
9 The frequency distribution of the perceived ﬁnancial insecurity is: 82% strongly agree with the statement,
11% mildly agree, 4% are neutral, 1% mildly disagree, and 2% strongly disagree. For tax morale, this
distribution is 68, 17, 9, 3 and 3%, respectively.
10 The results reported in the empirical analysis (cf. Sect. 3.2) are qualitatively the same when classifying
the respondents into two groups only, i.e., those having a high (low) tax morale and perceiving a high (low)
degree of ﬁnancial insecurity related to taxes. Individuals were classiﬁed as having a high tax morale and as
perceiving a high degree of ﬁnancial insecurity if they had reported the two highest categories in the
questionnaire (i.e., ‘strongly agree’=5 or ‘mildly agree’=4 on the 5-point scale).
11 For a theoretical model in which occupational choice depends on risk attitudes, see Pestieau and Possen
(1991).
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123future of not paying taxes today to choose to work in the informal sector, while those who
perceive a high degree of ﬁnancial insecurity to work in the formal sector. The former
beneﬁt ﬁnancially from not paying taxes today and do not perceive any future conse-
quences of this choice, either because they may not understand the ﬁnancial consequences
or because they may have other means to provide for themselves in the future. For the
individuals who perceive a high degree of ﬁnancial insecurity, the public insurance
schemes are the only source of social safety net, which they can have access to if they work
in the formal sector. We ran a Probit regression to explain the individual probability of
working in the informal sector by individual perception of ﬁnancial insecurity. The results
show that one’s perception of ﬁnancial insecurity related to not paying taxes has a very
small and insigniﬁcant effect on the probability of working in the informal sector
(a coefﬁcient of 0.059 with a t-value of 1.25).
12 In other words, whether an individual
perceives a low or high degree of ﬁnancial insecurity related to not paying taxes does not
have any inﬂuence on her or his decision to work in the informal sector. This indicates that
individuals do not self-select into one of the two sectors.
A second potential type of supply side endogeneity would occur if individuals’ par-
ticipation in the informal sector may depend on income-earnings’ options elsewhere (even
when individuals do not freely self-select into one sector). We have two variables to test
for this in our data set, namely: the number of household members who have a paid job (or
a dummy variable indicating that there is more than one household member working), and
the number of family members living abroad who ﬁnancially support the individual. One
would expect that individuals without alternative sources of income would have a higher
probability to be in the informal sector. A probit analysis of the probability of working in
the informal sector however shows that the effect of both variables is statistically
insigniﬁcant.
Finally, a third source of sample selection bias may be driven by the demand side. For
example, when individuals with certain characteristics, such as low education and skills, are
chosen less often to work in the formal sector. Looking at our sample we cannot exclude this
option as people with higher education have a statistically signiﬁcantly lower probability to
be working in the informal sector. This may lead to an inconsistent estimate of the effect of
informal sector on ﬁnancial satisfaction if education inﬂuences both working in the informal
sector and the level of ﬁnancial satisfaction. This would be the case if lower educated
individualsnotonlyhaveahigherprobabilityofworkingintheinformalsectorbutalsohavea
set of unobservable characteristics (such as reduced social network and capacity to deal with
adversities) that correlate negatively with ﬁnancial satisfaction. One would correct for this
possible source of endogeneity by using instrumental variables.
13 Some studies use human
capitalcharacteristics toestimate boththeselectionmechanismand themainequation.They
do that by using different speciﬁcations of the education variables, which may lead to biased
results(DustmannandvanSoest1998).Moreover,itisdifﬁculttobelievethateducationdoes
not affect ﬁnancial satisfaction in other ways than through the probability of working in the
formalsector.Thus,asDustmannandvanSoest(1998)concluderegardingselectionbetween
private and public sector: ‘‘…correcting for nonrandom selection is important, but is only
useful if appropriate instrumental variables are available which play a role in the selection
mechanism, but can be excluded from the wage equation.’’ (p. 1419). Apart from education,
otherauthorshaveinstrumentedsectorchoiceby,amongothers,theregionoforigin,gender,
age, number of children and other household structure variables (Gindling 1991; Magnac
12 Details are available upon request.
13 If we were to have panel data, we would have used ﬁxed effects to partly correct for the endogeneity.
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1231991). In our data set, many of these variables proved not to have any effect on sector
selection. In addition, age, gender and being married suffer from the same weaknesses as
education.Onecouldalsoexploitgeographicvariation(seeBeuranandKalugina2006),time
variation (de Holanda and Filho 2005), or information on parent’s occupation or education
(e.g., Dustmann and Van Soest 1998). Given the cross-sectional natureof our dataset and its
restriction to individuals located in only one region, we do not possess such instruments.
Therefore, the best we can do is to look at the effect of working in the informal sector on
ﬁnancial satisfaction while controlling for those observable characteristics that differ
between individuals in the formal and informal sector. Apart from having lower education,
being a woman, older, and having emigrating to Tirana from rural areas also increase the
probability of being in the informal sector. These variables will be included in the ﬁnancial
satisfaction equation.
2.5 Data
The analysis is based on data collected in a ﬁeld survey conducted by one of the authors in
2000, in the urban area of Tirana, the capital of Albania. The method applied is the ‘self-
administered questionnaire’, which combines personal contacts with written question-
naires. The survey sample consisted of 1,500 households living in Tirana, which repre-
sented about 1.1% of Tirana households in 2000. The sampling was random and based on a
geographical framework, covering the ﬁve –more or less equally sized– regions of urban
Tirana. The main income earner of the household was asked to respond to all the questions.
The response rate of 89.3% gave 1,340 valid questionnaires returned.
14 For a more detailed
description of the data collection method, see Ge ¨rxhani (2007). She discusses the repre-
sentativeness of the data collected by comparing its results to the most recent survey
available with comparable data by the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT). From the
comparison, it appears that the average age of the respondents, average size of the
household, percentage of children in the household, and gender division of adult members
in the household are very similar in the two surveys. Hence, it is concluded that the data
collected in 2000 are to a large extent representative of Tirana households.
The data contain information about individual self-reported ﬁnancial satisfaction on a
0–10 scale. The sample average equals 3.37, which is very low compared to the two most
well known data sets utilizing this question, that is, ﬁnancial satisfaction scores in the
United Kingdom and Germany (see van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004, Chap. 3).
However, the low score of Financial Satisfaction in Albania compares very well to the
level of subjective welfare reported in the Albanian LSMS data set of the World Bank
(2003). According to this data set, about 80% of the respondents in Tirana reported to be
either ‘not at all satisﬁed’ or ‘less than satisﬁed’ with their ﬁnancial situation.
Our data set also provides information on the sector in which individuals work. This is
used to distinguish between individuals working in the formal and informal sectors.
Respondents were asked to report the sector they work in from a list of seven categories
(e.g., public sector, private sector (with and without labor contract), and own business).
This information was combined with other available information on reported tax payments
(e.g., (non)payment of personal income tax or small business tax). The result is a dummy
variable indicating whether an individual works in the formal or informal sector.
15
14 The complete questionnaire can be found in Ge ¨rxhani (2002, 2007) and will be provided upon request.
15 Individuals are classiﬁed as working in the formal sector if: (1) they work in the state sector; (2) they
work in their own business and they declare to pay taxes; (3) they work in their family business and they
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123Individuals are classiﬁed as working in the informal sector if: (1) they work in their own
business and they do not pay taxes; (2) they work in their family business and they do not
pay taxes; (3) they work in the private sector without a labor contract; (4) they do occa-
sional work and they do not pay taxes; and (5) they do other work and do not pay taxes. In
the sample, 24.6% of the respondents work in the informal sector.
16 Individuals with more
than one job (this is 13% of the sample) are classiﬁed as working in the formal sector if at
least one of their jobs is in this sector.
17 In addition, the data contain information on
individuals’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and edu-
cation), household monthly net income, taxes, and other information relevant for a tran-
sition country like Albania (e.g., the number of family members living abroad who
supports the family ﬁnancially). Finally, the data provide information on individual atti-
tudes to various statements related to paying taxes. Two of these attitudinal questions are
used to study the importance of perceived ﬁnancial insecurity and tax morale in explaining
the relationship between working in the (in)formal sector and ﬁnancial satisfaction
(cf. Sect. 2.3). In a study of tax evasion, Ge ¨rxhani (2004a) uses these and other questions as
a measure of informal institutions. For the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
analysis, see Table 2 in the Appendix.
3 Results
The presentation of the results is split in two parts. First, ﬁnancial satisfaction is explained
by whether or not an individual works in the informal sector, by the household monthly net
income, and by a large set of socio-economic and demographic variables (cf. Eq. 1).
Second, the analysis proceeds by distinguishing between various groups of individuals
based on their perceived ﬁnancial insecurity related to not paying taxes and their tax
morale (cf. Eq. 2). In addition, the individual ﬁnancial satisfaction related to working in the
informal sector is evaluated in terms of income.
3.1 Financial Satisfaction and the (in)formal Sector
Table 1 presents the estimation results for Eq. 1 (speciﬁcation 1 in the table). These are to a
large extent consistent with the existing literature on countries intransition (see Ravallion and
Lokshin 2002; van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004). On the one hand, the explanatory
variables ‘male’, ‘married’, ‘higher education’, and ‘net family income’ have a positive
coefﬁcient,although‘male’non-signiﬁcantlyso.Ontheotherhand,thecoefﬁcientsfor‘having
children’and‘familysize’showanegativesign,althoughthelastcoefﬁcientisnon-signiﬁcant.
Albania has its own particularities, however, which relate to its phase of development.
They involve the following: the effect of having (and being ﬁnancially supported by)
Footnote 15 continued
declare to pay taxes; (4) they work in the private sector with a labor contract; (5) they do occasional work
and they declare to pay taxes; and (6) they do other work and declare to pay taxes.
16 Note that there are no other comparable data sources that measure the underground economy in Albania
through informal employment.
17 This is because by having at least one job in the formal sector, they have the right to social beneﬁts. The
regression analysis (below) corrects, nevertheless, for having more than one job by including a dummy
variable (‘moonlighting’), which takes value 1 if an individual has more than one job and 0 otherwise. Note
that classifying these individuals as being in the informal sector produces qualitatively very similar results to
the ones presented here.
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123family members living abroad is positive on individual ﬁnancial satisfaction; having lived
in a rural area before transition also affects ﬁnancial satisfaction positively (this may
capture a comparison effect with the past); and having more than one job also has a
positive coefﬁcient (although only signiﬁcant at 13.1%).
Finally,theempiricalanalysisshowsthatthecoefﬁcientforworkingintheinformalsector
isnegativebutnotstatisticallysigniﬁcant.Belowweshowthatthisnon-signiﬁcantcoefﬁcient
is a weighted average across two groups of individuals for whom working in the informal
sector has a different impact on their ﬁnancial satisfaction. By correcting for individuals’
perceptionoftheirﬁnancialinsecurityrelatedtonotpayingtaxes,theeffectofworkinginthe
informal sector on ﬁnancial satisfaction becomes statistically strong and negative.
3.2 Financial Satisfaction, Perceived Financial Insecurity and Tax Morale
The second speciﬁcation (fourth and ﬁfth columns) of Table 1 presents the estimation
results for Eq. 2.
18 The interaction between working in the informal sector and perceived
ﬁnancial insecurity has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect, which means that for
Table 1 Financial satisfaction albania, OLS
Specif. 1 Specif. 2 Specif. 3
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Constant -7.540 (1.55) -4.86 -7.029 (1.66) -4.24 -6.431 (1.64) -3.93
Male 0.186 (0.17) 1.12 0.284 (0.17) 1.70 0.289 (0.17) 1.73
Ln(Age) -0.239 (0.35) -0.68 -0.346 (0.35) -0.98 -0.344 (0.35) -0.98
Individual is married 1.075 (0.33) 3.26 1.052 (0.33) 3.19 1.066 (0.33) 3.23
Individual has children -1.011 (0.28) -3.63 -0.964 (0.28) -3.44 -0.989 (0.28) -3.53
Ln(Family size) -0.287 (0.24) -1.20 -0.248 (0.24) -1.03 -0.236 (0.24) -0.98
Individual has higher education 0.485 (0.15) 3.30 0.473 (0.15) 3.19 0.488 (0.15) 3.29
Migration from North or South to
Tirana
-0.101 (0.16) -0.62 -0.119 (0.16) -0.74 -0.111 (0.16) -0.68
Migration from rural to Tirana 0.42 (0.23) 1.86 0.232 (0.23) 1.02 0.238 (0.23) 1.04
Working in the Informal sector -0.139 (0.17) -0.83 1.999 (0.98) 2.05 -0.081 (0.17) -0.48
Informal 9 Perceived ﬁnancial
insecurity
-0.430 (0.19) -2.25
Perceived ﬁnancial insecurity -0.044 (0.10) -0.43 -0.172 (0.09) -1.97
Informal 9 Tax morale -0.047 (0.15) -0.32
Tax morale -0.201 (0.09) -2.30 -0.216 (0.07) -3.01
Moonlighting: having more than
one job
0.308 (0.20) 1.51 0.346 (0.21) 1.67 0.332 (0.21) 1.60
Ln(Number of family members
working)
0.281 (0.20) 1.42 0.287 (0.20) 1.42 0.290 (0.20) 1.43
Ln(Number of (family) emigrants) 0.765 (0.33) 2.34 0.924 (0.34) 2.72 0.900 (0.34) 2.64
Ln(Net family income) 1.144 (0.09) 13.43 1.170 (0.09) 13.05 1.170 (0.09) 13.03
Observations 908 880 880
R
2 0.229 0.246 0.242
Note: standard deviations are in parentheses
18 Note that the coefﬁcients of variables included in both equations are almost identical.
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123individuals working in the informal sector there is a negative relationship between ﬁnancial
satisfaction and agreeing with the statement that not paying taxes today has ﬁnancial
consequences in the future. As for individuals who do not perceive a high degree of
ﬁnancial insecurity (i.e., the ones who ‘strongly disagree’ that not paying taxes today has
consequences for the future), the results show that working in the informal sector correlates
positively with ﬁnancial satisfaction. The total coefﬁcient for the majority of individuals
(82% of the sample) who perceive the highest degree of ﬁnancial insecurity due to not
paying taxes (i.e., the ones who report a 5 (=‘strongly agree’)) is -0.150 (=1.999 ?
(-0.430 9 5)). The impact of working in the informal sector on ﬁnancial satisfaction is
positive for all the other individuals (18% of the sample), the ones who report anything else
than ‘strongly agree’ (i.e., from ‘mildly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’).
19
We can thus conclude that speciﬁcation 1 was unable to distinguish between different
types of individuals whose effect of working in the informal sector on their ﬁnancial
satisfaction is distinct. The effect of the variable indicating the degree of perceived
ﬁnancial insecurity is insigniﬁcant and very small. It is only through the interaction with
the sector in which one works that perceived ﬁnancial insecurity affects individual
ﬁnancial satisfaction.
The coefﬁcient of the interaction term between working in the informal sector and tax
morale is very small and non-signiﬁcant, indicating that the effect of working in the
informal sector on ﬁnancial satisfaction does not seem to depend on individuals’ morale
about contributing to society through taxes (i.e., public goods). The coefﬁcient of tax
morale is however negatively correlated with ﬁnancial satisfaction. This implies that the
higher the tax morale, the less satisﬁed individuals are with their ﬁnancial situation,
regardless of whether they work in the formal or informal sector. For individuals working
in the formal sector, it seems that the economic burden of paying taxes outweighs the
‘warm glow’ effect of contributing to others’ well-being. As hypothesized, individuals
working in the informal sector and having a high tax morale are ﬁnancially less satisﬁed
because they are unable to contribute to the society through taxes.
20
Finally, the third speciﬁcation of Table 1 shows that including the two variables—
perceived ﬁnancial insecurity and tax morale- without the interaction terms generates
similar results as speciﬁcation (1).
The importance of the correlation between ﬁnancial satisfaction and working in the
informal sector (for individuals who perceive a high degree of ﬁnancial insecurity) can also
be evaluated in terms of income by calculating the compensating income and the income
equivalent of working in the formal sector (for similar approaches see Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and van Praag 2002; Blanchﬂower and Oswald 2004).
From Eq. 2 we can derive the income necessary to compensate an individual who
perceives the highest degree of ﬁnancial insecurity (i.e., reporting a 5 (=‘strongly agree’)
for the loss of satisfaction due to working in the informal sector:
Dlny ¼
c þð 5   uÞ
b
  1 ) Dy ¼ exp




19 We performed a robustness check and found that the results in speciﬁcation 2 do not change when
excluding ‘tax morale’ from the regression.
20 Other studies have looked at the effect of ﬁnancial satisfaction on tax morale and have empirically found
that a higher level of ﬁnancial satisfaction leads to a higher level of tax morale or willingness to pay taxes
(for an extensive overview, see Torgler 2007).
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123The equivalent loss is the reciprocal of the compensating income. Applying the estimated
coefﬁcients in Table 1 (speciﬁcation 2) to this equation we ﬁnd that by moving from the
formal to the informal sector an individual who perceives a high degree of ﬁnancial
insecurity would experience a satisfaction loss equivalent to 12% of his or her income. The
(compensating) income necessary to bring this individual back to the initial level of
satisfaction is a 19.2% income increase. These results show the economic relevance for
ﬁnancial satisfaction of moving from the formal to the informal sector.
In summary, the results show that the effect of working in the (in)formal sector on
ﬁnancial satisfaction (after controlling for income and other variables), can be attributed to
the individual perception of ﬁnancial insecurity related to not paying taxes. For individuals
working in the informal sector, the higher (lower) the degree of perceived ﬁnancial
insecurity, the lower (higher) is their ﬁnancial satisfaction.
4 Conclusion
Comparative studies of individuals working in the formal and informal sectors have
mainly focused on the income differential between the two sectors. Even when other
aspects like ease of entry and social exclusion are theoretically recognized, it has
remained an open question what the effect of working in the formal or informal sector is
on an individual’s welfare.
21 This paper adds to the literature by providing an empirical
answer to this question. We were able to do that by using a subjective welfare
measurement, i.e., ﬁnancial satisfaction. More speciﬁcally, we focus on the relationship
between working in the formal or informal sector and ﬁnancial satisfaction in a country
in transition. In addition to an informal sector of a larger magnitude, it has long been
argued that this sector plays a role in these countries that is much different than its role
in developed countries. In particular, the informal sector in transition countries provides
a route towards survival for individuals who are unable to ﬁnd employment in the formal
sector (Ge ¨rxhani 2004b).
When considering the effect of the sector on the (self-reported) ﬁnancial satisfaction we
observe that for most individuals, working in the informal sector has negative effects on
their subjective welfare. However, some individuals who work in the informal sector are
ﬁnancially even more satisﬁed than their counterparts in the formal sector. We are able to
explain this dichotomy by distinguishing between two types of individuals based on their
perceived ﬁnancial insecurity and their tax morale. The differentiating characteristic of the
individuals who are more satisﬁed in the informal sector is that they perceive a low degree
of ﬁnancial insecurity, i.e., they disagree that not paying taxes today has personal ﬁnancial
repercussions in the future. It is likely that these individuals have other means to provide
for themselves in the future, for example through family or accumulated wealth. As such,
they report a high ﬁnancial satisfaction because they do not mind being excluded from
public insurance by working in the informal sector. For other individuals, representing the
majority of the individuals working in the informal sector, public insurance schemes like
social security may be the only source of social safety net in the future. By working in the
21 For example, in their study on Nicaragua, Pisani and Paga ´n( 2003) presume that the willingness to queue
for a formal sector job might be related to pecuniary and nonpecuniary beneﬁts associated with the formal
sector jobs that matter to informal sector workers.
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123informal sector they are automatically excluded from these mechanisms, which makes
them ﬁnancially less satisﬁed.
By focusing on subjective measures, we are able to capture effects that cannot be
observed if comparisons are based only on wage differentials as the classical models of
formal-informal wage dualism claim (see Harris and Todaro 1970; Bardhan and Rudra
1981; Fields 1975 onwards). As shown in this paper, the impact of the working sector on
individual welfare goes beyond income. This impact is of a particular importance for
transition countries with large informal sectors. Given the involuntary participation in the
informal sector in these countries, the majority of individuals working in this sector will
remain ﬁnancially unsatisﬁed as long as they have no other source of social safety. An
important implication is that policies aiming at welfare improvement and social equality,
should either try to increase the number of jobs available in the formal sector, such that
individuals can voluntary choose in which sector to work or at least make sure that
individuals who are forced to work in the informal sector are aware of the ﬁnancial
consequences for their future pensions. In both cases, an alternative private system of
individually building up a pension should be available and accessible by every individual,
irrespective of the sector they work in.
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Appendix
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Male 0.754 0.431 0 1
Ln(Age) 3.743 0.219 2.833 4.304
Individual is married 0.910 0.287 0 1
Individual has children 0.866 0.341 0 1
Ln(Family size) 1.426 0.332 0 2.485
Individual has higher education 0.454 0.498 0 1
Migration from North or South to Tirana 0.334 0.472 0 1
Migration from rural to Tirana 0.141 0.348 0 1
Working in the Informal sector 0.246 0.431 0 1
Perceived ﬁnancial insecurity 0.904 0.294 0 1
Tax morale 0.823 0.382 0 1
Moonlighting: having more than one job 0.134 0.341 0 1
Ln(Number of family members working) 0.180 0.368 0 2.197
Ln(Number of (family) emigrants) 0.045 0.211 0 1.792
Ln(Net family income) 10.333 0.828 0 13.122
No. of observations 908
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